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THE MILLENNIAL CORPORATION
Michal Barzuza 1, Quinn Curtis 2 and David H. Webber 3
September 6, 2021
DRAFT
In a prior paper, Shareholder Value(s): Index Fund ESG Activism and The New Millennial Corporate
Governance, we argued that the index funds’ sudden shift towards socially-responsible investment, after
decades of ignoring or opposing it, was driven by the competition to manage growing Millennial wealth. In
our view, the main contribution of that paper was identifying sharp differences between Millennials and prior
generations over investment, consumption, and employment. It has now become clear that this contribution
has implications far beyond index-fund environmental, social and governance (“ESG”) activism and is in
fact completely transforming the corporate world, marking a fundamental shift in how corporations function
and requiring a new framework for analysis. This paper delineates a radical new framework for what we call
The Millennial Corporation.
We argue that the Millennial-driven rise of stakeholderism and socially-responsible investing are features of
a comprehensive cultural shift in how corporations are expected to behave, rendering earlier accounts of
corporate behavior incomplete or obsolete. While there have been moments in the recent past when
corporations promoted stakeholderism, these moments were transient and primarily rhetorical, with
corporations quickly returning to the business-as-usual of shareholder primacy. This time, Millennials have
made it impossible to return to business-as-usual. We show that, unlike Baby Boomers and Generation X,
this generation is far more likely to take its politics to work, to the store or website, and to the investment
portfolio. This consolidation of economic identity creates feedback effects that collapse the distinction
between so-called political considerations, maximizing returns, and stakeholder interests in ways that are
eroding traditional corporate law norms.
Far from liberating managers from meaningful constraints--as critics of stakeholder corporate governance
often allege--this new dynamic has imposed even further constraints on managers. We show that Millennial
stakeholderism is fundamentally different from the stakeholderism of the past. As a result of Millennials’
influence, managers have strong incentives to promote stakeholder interests. In fact, they have no choice but
to do so. Furthermore, rather than helping managers to insulate themselves, the new stakeholderism exposes
managers to higher scrutiny. We present both a theoretical analysis and evidence supporting our account of
the rise of the Millennial Corporation.
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“Stories of American industry's competitive woes are starting to give way to stories of corporate
revival, at such well-known and diverse companies as Ford, May Department Stores and Xerox.
The revival can usually be traced to a new respect for radical change...The new order eschews
loyalty to workers, products, corporate structure, businesses, factories, communities, even the
nation. All such allegiances are viewed as expendable under the new rules. With survival at stake,
only market leadership, strong profits and a high stock price can be allowed to matter.”
---Steve Prokesch, “Remaking the American CEO,”
The New York Times, Jan. 25, 1987.
“Breaking with decades of long-held corporate orthodoxy, the Business Roundtable issued a
statement on ‘the purpose of a corporation,’ arguing that companies should no longer advance
only the interests of shareholders. Instead, the group said, they must also invest in their
employees, protect the environment and deal fairly and ethically with their suppliers. ‘While each
of our individual companies serves its own corporate purpose, we share a fundamental
commitment to all of our stakeholders,’ the group, a lobbying organization that represents many of
America’s largest companies, said in a statement. ‘We commit to deliver value to all of them, for
the future success of our companies, our communities and our country.’”
---David Gelles and David Yaffe-Bellany,
“Shareholder Value is No Longer Everything, Top
CEOs Say,” The New York Times, Aug 19, 2019

INTRODUCTION
In this Article, we argue that Millennial and Gen Z investment, consumption, and
employment behaviors differ so sharply from those of preceding generations that they are
fundamentally altering the corporation. We think that these Millennial behaviors are powering the
major developments in corporate law today, including the rise of Employee, Environmental,
Social, and Governance (“EESG”) investing, the rise of stakeholderism, the 2019 Business
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Roundtable break with shareholder primacy, and so-called CEO Activism. 4 Combined, these
developments are changing the corporate world in multiple ways, the most prominent of which
include: (1) managers have no choice but to engage in EESG because of bottom-up pressure from
Millennials; (2) Millennials’ consolidated political/economic identity—their tendency to take their
politics everywhere they go, to the workplace, the store, the portfolio, as described below—is
overriding the usual collective action problem for shareholders; and (3) these developments result
in a new kind of short-termism in which CEOs and corporations act defensively to avoid cancel
culture and rapid reputational damage from getting on the wrong side of Millennials’ politics. As
noted, we first identified the transformative power of Millennials on index fund EESG-activism in
a prior paper, Shareholder Value(s): Index Fund ESG Activism and The New Millennial Corporate
Governance. 5 In this article, we reveal how much further Millennial influence has extended
beyond index-fund activism to fundamentally reshape the corporate world, requiring a new
framework of analysis we call The Millennial Corporation.
Four features of the Millennial generation are driving this fundamental change: (1) its
progressive social orientation, which is observably to the left of both the Baby Boomers and
Generation X, not just currently, but when they were at the same age; (2) its massive size, standing
to inherit $30 trillion in assets, already accounting for over $1 trillion in annual consumption, and
projected to constitute 75% of the workforce by 2030, all of which enable it to impose its values; 6

4

We depart from the convention of using the term “ESG” for environmental, social, and governance investing in
favor of “EESG,” employee, environmental, social, and governance investing, as advocated by Leo Strine. See, Leo
E. Strine, Jr., Toward Fair and Sustainable Capitalism 6 (Roosevelt Inst., Working Paper No. 202008, 2020),
https://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads//08/RI_Toward
FairandSustainableCapitalism_WorkingPaper_202008.pdf [https://perma.cc/69BL-P6MD].
5 David Webber, Michal Barzuza & Quinn Curtis, Shareholder Value(s): Index Fund ESG Activism and the New
Millennial Corporate Governance, 93 S. Calif. L. Rev. 1243 (2020).
6
Caitlin Mullen, Gen Buy: Millennials projected to spend $1.4 trillion as influence grows, BizWomen, Jan. 13, 2020,
available at: https://www.bizjournals.com/bizwomen/news/latest-news/2020/01/gen-buymillennials-projected-tospend-1-4-trillion.html?page=all.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3918443

(3) its increasingly consolidated political/economic identity, which ignores traditional distinctions
between investing, shopping, and worklife, infusing all three with (mostly) progressive politics;
and (4) its sophisticated use of social media to monitor and punish companies that deviate from its
wishes. While any one of these features on its own might not have triggered a fundamental shift in
how corporations operate, when combined, the net effect is powerful, and is rendering
anachronistic the traditional vocabulary of corporate law, requiring new ways of thinking.
In attempting to explain once-marginal and now-ubiquitous EESG and socially responsible
investing, scholars have largely tried to fit these developments into existing intellectual
frameworks, ones that we believe are inadequate to the task. These accounts can be subdivided
into some familiar camps, including the shareholder primacy camp, the reactionary managers
camp, the political dysfunction camp, and the concentrated economic power camp. Briefly, the
shareholder primacy camp argues that EESG is just the latest hot political topic to come along,
that CEOs will adjust rhetorically and perhaps take some concrete steps to deal with it, but that it
will all be absorbed into shareholder primacy. 7 An alternative shareholder primacy view,
propounded by the EESG investing community itself, insists that socially-responsible investing is
simply the most enlightened form of maximizing long-term value, that there is no conflict between
caring for the environment, improving worker compensation, promoting diversity, and returns. 8 In
contrast, the reactionary managers camp sees EESG as a genuine threat to shareholder primacy,

7

Dorothy S. Lund & Elizabeth Pollman, The Corporate Governance Machine, 122 Colum. L. Rev. (forthcoming
2022).
8
See, e.g., Martin Lipton,Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Further on the Purpose of the Corporation, HARV. L. SCH.
F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (July 20, 2021) (“The objective and the purpose of a corporation is to conduct a lawful,
ethical, profitable and sustainable business in order to ensure its success and grow its value over the long term.”)
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/07/20/further-on-the-purpose-of-the-corporation/; Martin Lipton, Steven A.
Rosenblum & Karessa L. Cain, Thoughts for Boards of Directors in 2020, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE (Dec. 10, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/12/10/thoughts-for-boards-of-directors-in2020/ [https://perma.cc/Y22J-YN2R].
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but views it as an ultimately insincere and exploitative attempt by corporate managers to clawback
power lost to shareholders in the shareholder-rights movement and to reduce managerial
accountability. 9 Another account stresses that the rise of EESG may be traced to political
dysfunction in Washington. 10 And finally, yet another view suggests that EESG is incompatible
with competition, describing it as a perk offered up by monopolists who are less accountable to
market forces. 11
On close inspection, each of these accounts can be understood within the long-standing,
manager-vs.-shareholder account of corporate structure. Perhaps managers are exploiting concerns
about the social impact of corporations to push back against the shareholder rights movement.
Perhaps corporate leadership is simply adopting social responsibility as an effective, but
ultimately cynical marketing campaign aimed at the concerned public and regulators. Or perhaps
we are witnessing the rise of a more sustainable approach to corporate behavior—one sensitive to
regulatory, environmental and even social risks, albeit one still ultimately aimed at creating
shareholder value perhaps at the expense of increased managerial discretion.
Managers, shareholders, and regulators: the key characters in a story stretching back
decades. Trends come and go. Power ebbs and flows among them, but, according to all of the
above schools of thought, the fundamental tensions remain the same, and the conventional
scholarly framework for understanding the relevant tradeoffs retains its explanatory power. On
this view, the rise of EESG and corporate social activism presents one in a long line of interesting

9

See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance, 106 Cornell L.
Rev. 91 (2020); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel & Roberto Tallarita, For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain, S. Cal.
L. Rev. (forthcoming 2021).
10
Edward B. Rock, For Whom is the Corporation Managed in 2020? The Debate over Corporate Purpose, 76 Bus.
Law. 363 (2021).
11
Mark J. Roe, Corporate Purpose and Corporate Competition (2021), available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3817788.
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phenomena, which will (and has) sparked no shortage of scholarly commentary, but it is, at the
end of the day, fodder for old debates over corporate purpose and the allocation of power within
the firm.
In this article, we argue that these accounts, and the shareholder/manager frame that
undergirds them, are overlooking a deeply important shift, a widespread and rapid change in
stakeholder preferences that is destabilizing the corporate space. That destabilization has rendered
inadequate each of the traditional frameworks for assessing the corporate landscape, depriving
them of the explanatory power they have wielded for decades. Simply put, EESG and the new
stakeholderism are not well explained by existing accounts of corporate law. They are best
explained by the increasing economic power of the Millennial generation (and, increasingly,
Generation Z) as consumers, investors, and employees, combined with the accelerants of social
media and rising political polarization.
Investors, consumers, and employees are, of course, among the key stakeholders of the
stakeholder account of corporate purpose. But ours is not a normative account. We argue that
millennial stakeholders are in fact exerting significant power in ways that shape corporate
behavior. To put it provocatively, the Business Roundtable statement embracing stakeholderism is
more a hostage statement than a vision statement. Large companies are adopting the rhetoric of
social purpose, and in many cases making concrete decisions consistent with that rhetoric, not
because CEOs see stakeholderism as a route to increased discretion and managerial slack, but for
precisely the opposite reason: hydraulic social and economic forces have constrained their options
and left them no choice but to engage with socially-oriented millennial stakeholders. 12

12

See Berkeley Lovelace Jr., CEOs’ shift away from shareholder value was aimed at millennials, says former
Business Roundtable president, CNBC Markets (August 19, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/19/ceos-shiftaway-from-shareholder-value-aimed-at-Millennials-john-engler.html.
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In framing it this way, it should be clear we reject the managerialist account of EESG and
corporate social purpose, but we also think it elides critical details to say that managers are
maximizing shareholder value even in an enlightened, sustainable way as some EESG advocates
argue. For example, it is, at best, unclear whether Delta Airlines created long-term value by
denouncing Georgia voting laws, 13 whether Amazon created long-term value by deplatforming
Parler, or whether Starbucks created value by allowing employees to wear Black Lives Matter
pins to work. 14 We take no position on the long-term share price implications of these decisions.
Our point is that the decisions in each case were made in response to acute, near-term
pressures, from stakeholders with real leverage whose primary concern was not the stock price of
the company. Our thesis is that such cases reflect a genuinely new phenomenon that is likely to
endure, will have a dramatic effect on corporate behavior and financial markets, and requires a
richer explanatory framework than the traditional account of managers, stakeholders, and
regulators.
But this is not just a governance story. Investors, too, will be affected by this new reality.
In our view, the best understanding of EESG investing is as a rational response to a world in
which, from moment to moment, companies can be swept into firestorms over, say, a manager’s
controversial comments, a routine contribution to a suddenly controversial legislator, a chemical
leak at a far-flung plant, and so on. Social media picks up on and amplifies these events,
significantly eroding what was once the traditional corporate advantage in controlling the flow of

13

See Thomas Pallini, Delta spent the pandemic earning goodwill from passengers and workers. It might be about to
vanish., Bus. Insider (Apr. 3, 2021, 7:38 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/delta-might-have-lost-pandemicgoodwill-georgia-voting-law-kemp-2021-3 (last visited Aug. 7, 2021) ([T]he public break between Delta and the state
government [] yielded repercussions . . . [when] Georgia’s House of Representatives on Wednesday night voted to
repeal a tax break on jet fuel that greatly benefits Delta.”).
14
See generally Haddon, infra note __..
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information, choosing what image it sought to project. As we will see in several case studies
below, Millennial consumers, workers, and investors, armed with social media, closely monitor
corporate conduct to ensure actual compliance with expressed values, and sharply call out, divest,
boycott, or refuse to work for companies that fall short. That affects all aspects of the corporation,
including its share price. It’s true that, in the past, securities laws have sometimes been used to
effect social change, by “naming and shaming” with disclosures around conflict minerals, political
spending, and CEO pay ratio. Some critics have seen the sudden clamor for disclosures around
diversity efforts and carbon footprint as an offshoot of this type of approach. But these critiques
have it backwards. When a litany of socially sensitive issues can suddenly become very real
problems for a consumer brand or for firms recruiting employees, even the most hard-nosed
investors must take notice. Information that no investor would have thought material a decade ago,
may suddenly become critically important, and disclosure (and our understanding of materiality)
need to keep pace.
Indeed, the Millennial generation is historically unique in being substantially to the left of
the political median and in seeking to organize their economic lives, including their consumption
and employment decisions, around their values in a way that their forebears simply did not. We
argue that the dramatic rise in concerns about corporate purpose, ESG, corporate political activism
(dubbed “Woke Capital” by its critics), and related phenomena are traceable to this fundamental
change.
Foregrounding these social realities is likely to be a more productive framework for
understanding the changing landscape of corporate governance and investment risk than the
manager/shareholder/stakeholder notions that have guided corporate debates in the past. It’s not
that these frameworks have been rendered false by these new developments. After all, there will

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3918443

always be shareholders, managers, and agency problems. Instead, these frameworks are losing
their explanatory power because stakeholders are interacting in new ways and finding new sources
of leverage, with investors worrying about climate change, employees worrying about how labor
in the supply chain is treated, and customers demanding that CEOs speak out on pressing social
issues, all backed by social media, and in each case, it is the millennial generation (with Gen Z
coming up quickly behind) driving these changes.
The key impact of these observations is that, while it is true that we are observing
corporations pivot toward stakeholder interests and social purpose, this pivot reflects a relative
reduction, rather than an increase in managerial power. The importance of Millennials as
consumers, employees, and even as shareholders is a constraint on managerial discretion just as
surely as the composition of the board of directors and the market for corporate control. Managers
and investors are faced with creating long-term value within the envelope of these constraints,
producing a strong incentive for investors to consider EESG risk and sustainability as relevant
considerations. This is distinguishable from arguments for EESG investing that draw a straight
line between sustainability and firm value. We argue that EESG factors, whether or not they are
value increasing in their own right, are relevant investment risks because they largely reflect social
concerns that may be salient to key stakeholders.
In Part I we discuss current views of the rise of stakeholderism. We pay special attention to
the reactionary managers camp, which asserts that with stakeholderism governance managers (1)
do not protect stakeholders; and (2) further insulate themselves. 15 In particular this camp argues

15

Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note _ at 158 (“urge institutional investors to avoid cooperating with hedge fund
activists and to side with and support corporate leaders.”); Bebchuk, Kastiel & Tallarita, supra note , at 2
(“stakeholderism would serve the private interests of corporate leaders by increasing their insulation from shareholder
oversight”)
.
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that managers will use the rise of EESG to get the support of index funds when activist hedge
funds run competing nominees to the board. The truth is likely just the opposite. The most recent
example of hedge fund Engine No. 1 using environmental issues to successfully run three
dissidents for the Exxon board suggests that managers are not using index fund EESG to thwart
hedge funds, rather, hedge funds are using EESG to win index fund support in further exposing
managers, combining EESG with traditional activist objectives like reforming executive
compensation and increasing payouts. 16 That is increased managerial exposure, not entrenchment.
We also part ways with the camp that ascribes EESG to concentrated economic power, that
considers EESG a kind of perk that can be offered only by the most powerful companies, which
are less accountable to shareholders. 17 In contrast, we argue that the opposite is closer to the truth:
EESG is so pervasive and so strongly demanded by Millennials that the only entities capable of
even partly resisting it are those with concentrated economic power, like Facebook, Amazon, and
Google. We also reject the view that EESG was a progressive alternative to a politically
dysfunctional Washington, 18 as it has only continued and even strengthened as the administration,
and senate recently changed hands. Finally, though there is some evidence correlating EESG with
long-term value, we do not believe that the phenomena we describe, about Millennial activism on
the environment and diversity, are truly about returns and returns alone. Indeed, there is some
evidence not just that this activism is changing the corporate world, but is also having salutary
effects on the environment and diversity themselves.

16

See Infra Section []
Mark J. Roe, Corporate Purpose and Corporate Competition (2021), available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3817788.
18
Edward B. Rock, For Whom Is the Corporation Managed in 2020? The Debate over Corporate Purpose, 76 Bus.
Law. 363 (2021)
17
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Part II discusses Millennials’ behavior as employees, consumers and investors. It shows
that there is plenty of evidence that Millennials are committed to their values, and are willing to
pay a premium for them, in all three dimensions. Managers report—and empirical evidence
supports—that diversity and environmentalism are necessary for recruiting and retaining talent.
Recent studies confirm that firms that support EESG pay lower wages—and nevertheless retain
their purpose-driven Millennial employees. Different surveys suggest that Millennials will switch
products for EESG reasons. And examples of bans and cancel culture continue to pop. Finally,
Millennials, who are willing to forgo returns for values, are driving the rise in EESG investments.
In Part III we analyze the effect of the millennial corporation on management incentives.
Far from liberating managers from meaningful constraints—as critics of stakeholder corporate
governance often allege—this new dynamic has imposed even further constraints on managers.
Millennials discipline managers through several important channels: markets (employment,
product, and investment), index funds activism, and recently also hedge funds activism. As a
result, managers have strong incentives to promote stakeholderism. The discipline channels that
grow out of Millennials’ preferences, result in decreased management insulation, contrary to the
predictions of the reactionary managers school. In support of our thesis, we show how activist
hedge fund Engine No. 1 leveraged environmental causes to succeed in its fight against
ExxonMobil, and how millennials’ preferences contributed to the passage of NASDAQ Board
Diversity Rules.
This part also demonstrates the profound net effect of Millennial preferences and their use
of social media to monitor and enforce them. We show not just that these preferences are
transforming the corporate world via EESG and stakeholderism, they are also having a real world
impact on the environment and on diversity, two of Millennials’ highest priorities. The evidence
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suggests that EESG is not just changing the corporate world, it is actually making our institutions
more diverse and improving the environment. We also show that these effects do not depend on
politics, economic conditions, or market concentration.
Finally, in Part IV, we spell out some of the implications of this profound transformation
of the corporate world. First, there is no reason to object to stakeholder governance. We reject the
reactionary managers camp which demands a return to shareholder primacy on the grounds that
the CEO who has many bosses has no boss. In our view, the CEO who has many bosses has many
bosses. EESG is not a top-down managerialist plot to escape shareholder power. It is a bottom-up
Millennial preference that exposes managers to shareholder power, worker power, consumer
power, and so on. The channels through which Millennial power flows--via shareholders,
employees, consumers--are less important than Millennial power and preferences themselves.
Second, Millennial preferences require rethinking our standards of disclosure and the
definition of material information. As we show below, Millennial demand for disclosure far
exceeds that which is currently required by the securities laws. Those laws require companies to
disclose material information, that is, information “that would assume actual significance in the
mind of a reasonable investor.” 19 Our research strongly suggests that the information that would
assume actual significance in the mind of a reasonable investor today differs sharply from what it
was twenty or even ten years ago. Information about diversity, sexual harassment settlements,
environmental infractions, political contributions, and other potentially socially salient issues that
would not have been considered financially material in the past are likely to play a growing role in
how investors manage risk. Securities (and corporate) law should keep pace with these
developments, adopting a flexible view of materiality, and a general presumption that investors

19

TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
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are entitled to information. From a corporate governance standpoint, managers need space to
navigate. Even managers making good faith efforts to put the long-term interests of shareholders
first will be forced to make concessions to other stakeholders when those stakeholders have real
power within the firm. Attempts to constrain managers’ capacity to respond to these forces may
do more harm than good. We therefore argue that courts and the SEC should be mindful of this
shift in letting notions of materiality change to better fit the needs of the actual marketplace.
We also use this final section to lay out how our thesis has several testable implications.
First, as the economic influence of Millennials expands over the coming decades, we think the
phenomena of corporate political activism and the weight given to EESG risks will become more
important features of the business landscape. Second, we think that these effects will be most
evident in industries featuring strong consumer brands or highly educated, well-compensated
workforces. These are the companies with the most to lose from mishandling sensitive social
issues. Third, we will see the rise of some conservative corporate activism. The general leftward
slant of corporate activism and many EESG concerns reflects the political reality of the Millennial
generation, which is left of center, at least for the time being. Moreover, the US political system
overweights white, rural voices, while economic power tends to concentrate in cities. The
marginal consumer or employee and the median voter are systematically different. We may
continue to observe progressive attempts to accomplish in the corporate space what they cannot in
the more traditionally political one.

I.

Traditional Corporate Law Theories Fail to Adequately Explain the Rise of EESG

and Stakeholderism
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A. The Rise of EESG and Stakeholderism

Both critics and advocates agree that once relatively marginal phenomena like socially
responsible investing and stakeholderism have taken center stage in the corporate world. 20 Some
recent examples to prove the point: after more than a decade of near total futility in which
shareholder proposals demanding that companies do more about global warming earned singledigit percentage support from shareholders, these proposals began winning majority support in
2017 with the backing of the Big Three. Larry Fink recently stated that the environment and
global warming were at the center of everything Blackrock does. 21 The 2021 proxy season brought
the most recent shock in favor of environmentally friendly investors as dissident shareholders
elected three environmentalists to the board of Exxon. 22
Efforts to increase gender and racial diversity in the corporate boardroom have made
significant strides in recent years. From State Street’s launch of the SHE fund and its rivalry with
Blackrock over who can more aggressively support the election of women as corporate board
directors, to this past proxy season’s success by the SEIU on racial equity audits, to the adoption
of diversity criteria by NASDAQ and Goldman Sachs for companies that list on the former or go
public via the latter, the march towards diversity has made significant strides, with the full
throated support of some of Wall Street’s most traditional players. 23 The flow of money to

20

See e.g., Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note , at 103 (2020) (“in the past decade, however, stakeholderism has been on
the rise, especially in terms of its acceptance by corporate executives, management advisors, and policy thought
leaders.”); Bebchuk, Kastiel & Tallarita, supra note (forthcoming 2021) (stating that the debate on stakeholderism
“seems to have reached a critical juncture”).
21
See e.g., Larry Fink’s 2021 Letter to CEO’s, BlackRock (“There is no company whose business model won’t be
profoundly affected by the transition to a net zero economy”) https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investorrelations/larry-fink-ceo-letter ; Andrew Ross Sorkin, BlackRock C.E.O. Larry Fink: Climate Crisis Will Reshape
Finance, NYTimes (Jan 14, 2020) https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/14/business/dealbook/larry-fink-blackrockclimate-change.html;
22
See infra Part
23
See discussion infra Part .

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3918443

sustainable funds continues to rapidly increase. In 2020, flows into sustainable funds exceeded
$50 billion, nearly tenfold increase over 2018, and almost a fourth of total flows into U.S. stocks
and bonds. 24 Total assets in U.S. sustainable funds exceed $200 billion, more than 70 percent
increase from their value in 2019. 25 Add to this the Business Roundtable statement referenced
earlier and the consensus is clear: ESG/stakeholderism has risen significantly. The question is
why? Many scholars have attempted to provide answers within the traditional frameworks of
corporate law.

B. Approaches to the Rise of EESG
Corporate law scholars have tried to explain the recent rise of EESG and stakeholderism,
and to make predictions on where it will lead us. Will EESG and stakeholderism grow or
disappear? Are managers truly committed to following their announcements or is it all just cheap
talk? For example, while the Business Roundtable announcement attracted significant attention
and publicity, and was described by some as radical, 26 numerous commentators believed that it did
not indicate a significant shift in the corporate form and purpose. 27 These different views, as
explained above, can be subdivided into some familiar camps, including the shareholder primacy
camp, the long-term value camp, the reactionary managers camp, the political dysfunction camp,
and the concentrated economic power camp.
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Jon Hale, Ph.D. CFA, A Broken Record: Flows for U.S. Sustainable Funds Again Reach New Heights,
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Roberto Tallarita, Stakeholder Capitalism Seems Mostly for Show, WALL ST. J., August 7, 2020.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3918443

The shareholder primacy camp represents general skepticism that anything will change
fundamentally in corporate law, and especially not the primacy of shareholders. Stakeholderism is
merely rhetorical, and our system will continue to be geared toward shareholders exclusively. 28
Managers’ incentives and acts are geared toward maximizing value to shareholders. 29 An
alternative shareholder primacy view, supported most prominently by Martin Lipton, equates
socially responsible investing with maximizing firms’ long-term value. 30
Other commentators, on the other hand, are both skeptical and concerned. They not only
argue that managers will not promote stakeholder welfare, but that armed with discretion and
freedom to allegedly protect stakeholders, managers will instead further insulate themselves from
shareholders. 31 A prominent pioneer of this reactionary managers view, Lucian Bebchuk, has
argued that managers in fact have no incentives to promote stakeholder interests, and can cleverly
use stakeholderism to insulate themselves from shareholder pressures. Bebchuk is not alone in this
view. For example, Larry Summers, who served as Harvard University president, and as US
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Dorothy S. Lund & Elizabeth Pollman, The Corporate Governance Machine 122 Colum. L. Rev. (forthcoming
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30
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Cain, supra note ; Cf., Madison Condon, Externalities and the Common Owner, 95 Wash. L. Rev. 1 (2020) (arguing
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greenhouse gas emissions and therefore explaining at least the environmental activism of institutional investors. Condon
also argues that such investors might push companies to deviate from maximizing returns. In our view, even nonuniversal investors like hedge funds and companies of all scopes and sizes are moving on environmental issues,
suggesting that the internalization of externalities is not what’s driving even universal investors to move on the same.
As stated, we believe the main force operating here is the rise of millennials, though the funds could have multiple
motivations, including the one described by Condon); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Systematic Stewardship, Columbia Law and
Economics Working Paper No. 640 (2021) (explaining index funds ESG activism as an attempt to decrease systemic
risks). https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3782814.
Condon and Gordon theories build on index funds’ incentives to increase portfolio value, which are relatively weak.
See e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence,
and Policy, 119 Colum. L. Rev. 2029 (2019). The rise of millennials, on the other hand, created competitive pressure
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Treasury secretary opined that “without enforcement tools the statement lacked teeth,” and
speculated about the Business Roundtable’s alternative motives. 32
This reactionary management view has several important implications. First, it argues that
stakeholders will not benefit at all from the rise of EESG/stakeholderism. 33 In another paper
Bebchuk, Kastiel & Tallarita use the example of Other Constituency Statutes, which allowed
managers to take into account the interests of other constituencies in change-of-control situations,
as support for their argument that stakeholderism is a wolf in sheep’s clothing. 34 These statutes,
which were adopted in many states in response to the hostile takeover wave of the 80’s, arguably,
were intended to protect employees and other constituencies that were hurt by hostile takeovers. 35
Yet, in reality, Bebchuk, Kastiel & Tallarita have shown in recent work, employees and other
constituencies did not benefit from having them in place. 36 Rather, managers relied on them
primarily to benefit themselves. 37 This experience, the authors argue, suggests that stakeholderism
is doomed to fail. 38
Second, the reactionary managers’ view asserts that stakeholderism will be harmful as it
will lead to further management entrenchment. 39 In particular, in a recent paper, Bebchuk &
Tallarita argue that the current motivation of the stakeholderism movement is to empower
managers to use stakeholderism as a defense against activist hedge funds. 40 Recently activist
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hedge funds’ common strategy has been to run director nominees to the board. 41 Whether or not
they succeed depends, to a large extent, on whether they get the large index funds to vote in
support for their candidates. 42 The stakeholderism rhetoric, Bebchuk and Tallarita argue, will be
used by managers to “urge institutional investors to avoid cooperating with hedge fund activists
and to side with and support corporate leaders.” 43
Furthermore, managers can also use this rhetoric, they argue, to preempt legislative or
regulatory reforms that would truly aid stakeholders while constraining managerial power. 44 As a
result, not only will stakeholderism not provide meaningful benefits to stakeholders, but accepting
it “would be substantially detrimental to shareholders, stakeholders, and society”. 45 Bebchuk and
Tallarita advocate protecting stakeholders through governmental and not corporate action, that is,
with rules and regulations outside the realm of corporate law and governance. 46
Finally two other accounts attempt to explain the rise of EESG. One account attributes the
rise of EESG to public frustration with political dysfunction in Washington. 47 And yet another
view relies on the increased concentration in the product markets as the source for this rise. 48
Under this view, EESG is a luxury that monopolists can invest in with their monopolist slack
profits. 49 Firms in competitive industries who sell at marginal costs of production have no
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resources for EESG. 50 In contrast, monopolists or quasi-monopolists can abuse their market
power to offer the luxury of spending on EESG. 51
On close inspection, each of these accounts can be understood within the long-standing,
manager-vs.-shareholder account of corporate structure. While these commentators might be right
if history were repeating itself, we argue that times have changed. As the following parts will
show, managers are not driving EESG. They are responding to fierce demand for EESG from
Millennials and Gen Z, demand that hits them from all sides: consumption, employment and
investment, from both index funds and hedge funds. That demand creates strong incentives to
managers to protect stakeholders, and decreases rather than increases their insulation, contrary to
the predictions of the above schools of thought. This is the central feature of The Millennial
Corporation, in which bottom-up pressures force managers to act in the interests of stakeholders,
whether they want to or not.

II.

Millennials Are Driving the Rise of EESG
We argue that Millennials are the main drivers behind the recent rise of EESG and

Stakeholderism. In this section, we describe the burgeoning power of the Millennial generation
along with its left-leaning politics and its facility with social media. The combination of this
generation’s size and slant is transforming the corporate world.

50
51

Id.
Id.
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A. Millennial Demographics
First and foremost, the Millennial generation is enormous. It was born between 1981-1996
and has a population of 72 million. Generation Z, born between 1997-2012, has a population of
67 million. The Millennials constitute the largest generation in U.S. history, larger than the Baby
Boomers, born 1946-1964, with a population of 69.5 million, and larger also than Generation X,
born 1965-1980 with a population of 65 million, the smallest living generation. 52
Millennials and Generation Z combined already comprise a majority of the U.S.
population. 53 In 2020, it is estimated that Millennials spent $1.4 trillion. 54 By 2025 they are
expected to comprise half of the U.S. workforce and 75% of the global workforce. 55 And, as
described in our prior work, the Millennials stand to inherit roughly $24 trillion in assets,
described by BlackRock CEO Larry Fink as, “the largest asset transfer in history.” 56 In short,
Millennials are rapidly becoming the most dominant generation on the planet, and their priorities
matter to corporations.
The Millennials occupy a political space distinctly to the left of the country at large. 57 This
is not merely a matter of them being a relatively young cohort. Millennials are different from
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their predecessors in ways that do not have precedent in recent US history. Despite the folk
wisdom that younger individuals are always to the left of the median, recent research in political
science establishes that Millennials deviate from older cohorts in their leftward political bent. 58
The political preferences of Millennials relative to older cohorts is a novel feature of the political
landscape without precedent in recent memory. But it is not just a political fact, it increasingly
influences corporate behavior. This is because, as we will show in this section, Millennials are
more inclined to bring these values to work, to their consumer behavior than others, and liberals
are more inclined to do so than conservatives. This creates a new, persistent set of pressures on
firms. As we will argue in the next section, these pressures are pervasive, come from multiple sets
of stakeholders, and--as we will ultimately argue--act as an important new constraint on
management.
B. Millennials as Consumers, Employees and Investors
An extensive and still-emerging body of social science research demonstrates that
Millennial attitudes and behaviors towards consumption, work, and investment differ sharply
from the generations that preceded them, the Baby Boomers and Generation X. To generalize, it
is extremely important to Millennials that the companies where they work, shop, or invest are
both perceived to be forces for good in the world, and actually are. It is tempting to write off this
preference as merely rhetorical, but there is emerging evidence that Millennials are willing to
accept lower salaries, pay more for products, and obtain lower rates of return if they believe that
such sacrifices will actually improve the world, particularly when it comes to issues like the
environment and diversity. Raised on social media, Millennials are both able and willing to
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publicly attack companies that claim to do social good without backing it up with action. Whereas
workers in prior generations might genuinely have feared confronting management on political
issues, being labeled a troublemaker, marginalized, even fired and appended with the dreaded
label the “disgruntled former employee,” today, those same employees can obtain support both
inside and outside of the company on social media, and might even enhance their own standing
inside the company through such actions. Millennial and GenZ values, combined with social
media, have changed the incentive structures for political activism inside corporations, whether it
be by shareholders at the annual meeting, workers at the office, or customers at the mall or coffee
shop or restaurant or increasingly online.

59

As we review the research below, and examine actual episodes of cancel culture, it’s
important to bear one point in mind. CEOs themselves review this research, which is constantly
being sent to them by their own marketing, investor relations, and human resources departments.
They themselves see this evidence of Millennial and Gen Z interest in ESG, and they are also well
aware of many episodes of cancellation and boycott. This, in turn, likely has feedback effects,
further driving the move to EESG. 60
1. Employees – Recruiting and Retaining
As noted above, Millennials already comprise a majority of the workforce, a figure that will
rise to 75% by 2030 as the last of the Baby Boomers retire. 61 When it comes to what they say and
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what they do, the evidence strongly suggests that they want to work for companies that have a
positive social impact. They are reluctant to work for companies that are not sustainable, eesgfriendly, or diverse, and will even work for less to be employed by companies that share their values.
The survey evidence strongly supports this assertion, and early empirical evidence suggests it is
more than cheap talk.
Survey after survey shows that Millennials and Gen Z want to work for companies that do
social good. 62 A McKinsey study found that two-thirds of Millennials “Take a company’s social
and environmental commitments into account when deciding where to work. 63 Similar surveys
have found that Gen Z prioritizes purpose over salary. For example, on firm wrote of Gen-Z
workers:
They read Mission Statements and Values documents to select where they work
and want their employer’s values to match their values. They expect consistency
and authenticity and will call you out, often publicly, if they don’t see it. They will
leave companies they believe are hiding or putting too much spin on bad news,
ignoring their negative environmental or social impacts, or that have toxic
workplace cultures. 64
Aa recent academic study demonstrates that this is more than just rhetoric. In The Sustainability
Wage Gap, Philipp Krueger, Daniel Metzger, and Jiaxin Wu used a comprehensive and novel data
set to determine that workers, especially Millennials, do in fact accept lower pay to work for
sustainable companies:
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[W]e provide evidence that workers earn about 10% lower wages in firms
that operate in more sustainable sectors. We hypothesize that this
Sustainability Wage Gap arises because workers, especially those with
higher skills and from younger cohorts, value environmental sustainability
and accept lower wages to work in more environmentally sustainable firms
and sectors. Accordingly, we find that the Sustainability Wage Gap is larger
for high-skilled workers, especially for those with high non-cognitive skills,
and increasing over time. In further analysis, we document that more
sustainable firms are also better able to recruit and retain high-skilled
workers. 65
Another report found that “purpose-driven companies had 40% higher levels of workforce
retention than their competitors, and … turnover dropped by an average of 57% in the employee
group most deeply connected to their companies’ giving and volunteering efforts.” 66
These results, from both academic and industry sources provide strong evidence cutting
against the view that the rise of socially-responsible investing and stakeholderism is merely
rhetorical. Contrary to the dominant corporate law model in which shareholders, employees, and
customers each seek to maximize their own utility as shareholders, employees or customers alone,
these studies provide clear evidence that Millennial workers are willing to take home less pay for
themselves and their families to work at a company that they believe is doing good in the world.
The same is true for their willingness to stay in their jobs. Turnover is enormously costly to
companies. Building a sustainable company and creating a purpose-driven culture reduces that
cost. But it also tells us something about Millennial employees. One could easily imagine a
counternarrative, one that comes much closer to the narratives of traditional corporate law, one in
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which employees think: forget purpose and sustainability, increase my salary, increase my
benefits, or I will leave for another firm. Leaving your job can be a way to increase compensation,
benefits, or take time off. The evidence suggests that, for this generation, sustainability and a
broader sense of purpose beyond profits reduces such behavior. Attracting talent is the other side
of the same coin.
Even former employees have a kind of power today they did not have a few years ago.
Social media plays a role, as does the shift in culture described throughout this article. For
example, Yael Alflalo was the founder of Reformation, a highly-successful, sustainable fashion
brand with hundreds of millions of dollars in annual sales. 67 Reformation was described by New
York Magazine’s The Cut as “arguably the most successful sustainable fashion brand of all
time.” 68 But after the company announced on social media that it would be donating to
organizations affiliated with Black Lives Matter, the company and its CEO in particular were
called out on Instagram by a former manager of Reformation’s flagship store for racial
discrimination. 69 Elle Santiago described being repeatedly passed over for promotion in favor of
white women, and called out the CEO for repeat instances of demeaning behavior. 70 In addition to
pointing out racism, Santiago also lamented the fact that the company, despite positioning itself as
feminist and pro-woman, offered “a lack of options when it comes to sizing and fit (many of
Reformation’s It-dresses stop at a size 12, when the average US woman is now between a size 16-
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18).” 71 Alfalo-- the CEO--was fired. 72 Similar stories led to the swift departure of women’s coworking space The Wing’s Audrey Gelman, founder and editor-in-chief of Refinery29’s Christene
Barberich, and CrossFit founder and CEO Greg Glassman. 73
Yet another example was what occurred at Starbucks in the Summer of 2020. The
company faced sharp backlash from both customers and employees after banning baristas from
wearing Black Lives Matter pins at work. 74 The backlash was so intense that Starbucks not only
reversed its position but printed and distributed to its workers 250,000 Black Lives Matter and
other social justice t-shirts. 75 Internal corporate memos revealed that, in instituting the ban,
Starbucks deployed the standard, pre-Millennial corporate playbook by attempting to stay above
the political fray for fear of alienating customers with disparate political views. 76 Political
neutrality—on the surface, not behind the scenes—has long been the standard corporate response.
As Starbucks quickly learned, that doesn’t work anymore. Employees were so upset by the ban,
particularly after the killing of George Floyd, that the company was forced to hold a worker
“listening session” that prompted it to change course. 77 Starbucks has long recruited younger
workers, notably by providing benefits like college tuition assistance. 78 No company as dependent
on younger employees as Starbucks could afford to ignore Millennial voices. In the end, they did
not.
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2. Millennials as Consumers—They Shop Sustainably, They Boycott, They Cancel

As with employment, Millennial consumption patterns differ markedly from those of prior
generations. Here, the research also shows the extent to which this generation prizes social ends,
though we have more soft survey evidence than hard empirical evidence, in contrast to the
employment context. That said, CEOs receive and review this survey research, strongly
suggesting it affects their thinking. That survey research shows that Millennials consume
differently than previous generations. They are willing to pay more for sustainable goods. 79
Immersed in cancel culture, they also boycott and call out hypocrisy when they see it.
“Belief-driven buyers” comprise 69 percent and 67 percent of age groups 18-34 and 35-54,
respectively, compared to only 56 percent of those over age fifty-five. 80 These buyers “choose,
switch, avoid or boycott a brand based on where it stands on the political or social issues they care
about.” 81 A similar, more recent study by PWC showed that consumers are very responsive to
ESG: “Sixty-six percent of Americans believe it’s good for business when companies address
social justice issues [and] [s]ix-in-10 (61%) said they will reward companies that actively address
social justice issues.” 82 While this data referred to consumers overall, the evidence also shows that
Millennials are significantly more sensitive to EESG in their consumption choices. 83
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Substantial survey research suggests that Millennials will act on their politics as shoppers.
For example, a 2018 survey showed that 91% of Millennials reported that they would switch
products to a purpose-driven firm, compared to 66% of consumers overall. 84 More than a third (36
percent) of Americans claim that they have cancelled a brand in the past year, though 30 percent
have cancelled one-to-two brands, 5 percent three-to-five, and 1 percent over five brands. 85 Such
surveys are always subject to the concern they are cheap talk, reflecting respondent claims of what
they would do, not evidence of what they actually do. While it is difficult to track actual brand
switching at a macro level, several recent examples suggest that the surveys reflect more than
cheap talk.
For example, some sustainable companies have been called out for versions of
greenwashing—sometimes even falsely called out. For example, customers of Oatly, a Swedish
vegan milk brand, organized a boycott of the company. 86 Having built the company on the
principle that oatmilk was better for the environment and a more sustainable product than milk,
Oatly was excoriated on Twitter after selling a $200 million stake to a consortium including
private equity firm Blackstone, which had been purportedly making investments resulting in
deforestation of the Amazon. 87 In fact, Blackstone had made no such investments. 88 The
company’s response further illustrates the new realities of the Millennial Corporation. Blackstone
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immediately issued a press release, “Setting the record straight on Blackstone’s investment in the
Brazilian company Hidrovias,” describing the Twitter campaign as “blatantly wrong and
irresponsible,” pointing out that Hidrovias had no connection to deforestation and that it abided by
the Amazon Soy Moratorium, and further touting both Hidrovias’ and Blackstone’s commitments
to EESG. 89 Interestingly, Blackstone updated the press release in May 2021 to indicate that it had
liquidated its position in Hidrovias. 90 Oatly was not public at the time so we cannot check for
stock price or sales effects from this episode, but the company did recover to have a successful
IPO in May 2021.
The resurgence of the Black Lives Matter movement in response to the killing of George
Floyd swept through the corporate world as it did through the rest of society. IBM, Microsoft and
Amazon quickly announced bans or moratoriums on selling facial recognition technology to
police departments. 91 Google, Estee Lauder, and PepsiCo announced programs to increase
minority hiring. 92 Apple, Target and Comcast announced significant donations to advance social
justice initiatives. 93 While many of these initiatives were welcomed, they were not accepted at
face value or uncritically. Millennial consumers fact-check claims and use social media to call out
virtue signaling. For example, Sharon Cuter, the 33-year old founder of Uoma Beauty, a cosmetics
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company targeting Black women consumers, created the #pulluporshutup hashtag which quickly
went viral on Instagram. 94 Cuter accused companies of cheap talk in support of Black lives,
demanding that they disclose the racial makeup of their executives and workforce. 95 Cuter’s
targets weren’t alone. Despite its history of working with high-profile Black designers and
athletes, and its social media posts on racism, Adidas’s workforce was revealed to be fewer than
4.5 percent Black. 96 When employees raised issues of racism at a company meeting, Karen Parkin,
the company’s global head of human resources, characterized such talk as “noise” only raised in
the United States. 97 She rapidly resigned as employees successfully demanded that the company
increase hiring of Blacks and Latinos. 98 Adidas competitor Reebok quickly dropped its
sponsorship of the CrossFit Games after the CrossFit CEO tweeted inflammatory comments about
George Floyd’s killing. 99
These examples of callout culture and cancel culture pose a challenge to those who believe
that EESG is primarily rhetorical, that corporate managers can continue managing the company as
usual while paying lip service to important causes. Again, from the Porter Novelli Business &
Social Justice Study:
63 percent of individuals now say companies can no longer make a statement of
support without also showing their actions to address social justice issues . . .
[and] [m]ore than half (54%) of individuals say they are watching to see how
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brands have made progress in addressing social justice issues, and 45 percent
have gone so far as to do research to see what companies have done to make
headway against the commitments they made over the past year. 100
Millennial employees, consumers, and investors will fact check claims and callout
companies that fail to live up to their own rhetoric, often with significant economic consequences.
In response, there is some evidence of companies competing over how transparent they can be.
Many companies tout—and market researchers recommend—approaches like “radical
transparency” in which they go far beyond the demands of the securities laws to disclose, for
example, what factories they use, where they source their materials, how much their products
actually cost, and the demographics of their workforce. These approaches are aimed at building
Millennial loyalty. 101 Perhaps predictably, some companies like Everlane that promised such
transparency and then failed to live up to it experienced a harsh backlash when, for example,
accusations of racism and union busting emerged. 102 Further, we have seen the emergence of apps
like Good On You that cater to Millennials and Gen Z. Good On You offers ethical ratings for
fashion brands “to empower people’s shopping choices,” taking the position that, “Brands should
publish information about their supply chain and direct operations to increase accountability and
drive improved outcomes for people, the planet and animals. Consumers have a right to know how
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a brand impacts on the issues they care about.” 103 As of July 2020, the app had over 600,000
users. 104
3. Investors - Millennials Drive Investment in EESG
In previous work we argued that index fund EESG activism is driven by Millennial
preferences. 105 In a sentence, we argued that the reason why the index funds, and the big three in
particular, abruptly changed course around 2017 and began embracing EESG generally, and
environmental and diversity issues in particular, was to attract Millennial wealth. 106 Index funds
all own the same investments, so they cannot compete on performance. 107 They have all whittled
fees down to zero or close to it. 108 All they have left to compete over is assets under
management. 109 Millennials care about ESG, stand to inherit $24 trillion in wealth, and will soon
become the most dominant investors, consumers, and employees. 110 The race to manage their
retirement assets is what prompted the indexes to adopt EESG. 111 Rather than replicate those
arguments here, we refer the reader to our prior work, Shareholder Value(s): Index Fund ESG
Activism and the New Millennial Corporate Governance. 112
Since we published our paper, substantial additional evidence has emerged showing that
Millennials drive EESG investments. 113 Recent work shows that Millennials contributed over $51
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billion to sustainable investment funds in 2020, ten times what they had contributed just five years
earlier. 114 Concerns over climate change appear to be the largest driver of this growth. 115
Millennials are also making and investing more than ever as they advance in their careers. They
are more than twice as likely as Generation Xers to say that they often or always use investment
vehicles that take EESG into account (33% of Millennials versus 16% of Generation X and just
2% of Baby Boomers). 116 That research has also confirmed our view that the battle to manage the
massive transfer of wealth to Millennials was driving that sudden interest in EESG by the Big
Three and index funds more generally. 117 As etf.com CEO Dave Nadig stated, “The No. 1
question I get from advisors is how to handle the coming generational wealth transfer… EESG has
emerged as one of the dominant answers to that question.” 118

4.

Millennials Drove the Business Roundtable’s Rejection of Shareholder Primacy in

Favor of Stakeholderism

The evidence described above shows that Millennials really are different, and this
difference is what is driving change in corporate law. We are not the only ones who recognize
this. Though it has not been widely acknowledged within academia, Millennials were the reason
why the Business Roundtable made its blockbuster announcement on August 19, 2019 adopting
stakeholderism and abandoning shareholder primacy. By coincidence, another far less momentous
event took place that same day: we posted our paper, “Shareholder Value(s)...” to SSRN, arguing
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that Millennials were driving the pivot to EESG. It turned out that the Business Roundtable
announcement was driven by a recognition of the new reality we described in our paper. Former
BRT President John Engler could not have made it clearer: “The Business Roundtable’s statement
pledging to revise a longstanding principle of corporate governance was aimed at Millennials who
are growing skeptical of capitalism.” 119
Pfizer’s Sally Susman offered a more thorough explanation for the Roundtable’s motives:
The Business Roundtable announcement meant something very personal to
me as well. Now I have a better way to advocate for young people to
consider a career in business. Sure, I know many millennials who frown at
the thought of joining a corporation. But I also know others who are
finding truly meaningful work. . . . For any young person or individual rethinking their career, please take a moment to read the Business
Roundtable announcement. Then, give business a second look. 120
Susman’s focus was on employment, on recruiting Millennials for careers in business. But
it could just as easily be applied to nearly every interface between Millennials and the
corporate world, as employees, as consumers, as investors. The BRT announcement was
about reframing capitalism away from the “greed is good” image of the 1980s, captured
by the New York Times quote that introduced this article, and towards the more purposedriven orientation Millennials demand of it today. As Engler noted, “We better let the
American public, especially this massive new [Millennial] generation that’s coming up,
understand what’s brought them unprecedented wealth and success and opportunity.” 121
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As it turns out, the Business Roundtable announcement was just one of many
transformations wrought by the rise of the Millennials.

C. Summary
In sum, the evidence shows that Millennials prioritize EESG as employees, consumers,
and investors. Survey research, empirical research, experimental research, and numerous case
studies demonstrate that this preference is not just rhetorical. Millennials will change jobs or stay
in jobs depending on whether they view their employer as a purpose-driven, sustainable company.
They will boycott brands, callout brands, actively seek out new brands, and use apps and other
forms of ethical assessment to shape their consumption habits. They will seek out investment
funds that will use their shareholder power to promote environmental and diversity issues.
Companies that use these values as a marketing ploy without backing it up with concrete
action—or worse, by acting in ways that directly contradict the rhetoric—face harsh backlash
from Millennial employees, consumers, and investors. Social media offers unprecedented ability
for users to monitor corporate behavior and expose corporate misbehavior. 122 There are many
examples in which that backlash becomes particularly harsh when motivated by a sense of
betrayal, in which supposedly sustainable and purpose-driven companies violate the implicit or
explicit promises they make to their Millennial stakeholders. Millennials are serious about their
commitments and if they sense that companies are not, they act on it. Transparency in itself is
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becoming more valuable, in part because social media and cancel culture provide unprecedented
opportunities not just to access but to act on information.
Moreover, corporate managers constantly receive evidence of these Millennial, and
increasingly Gen Z, preferences. 123 They see the data, and they are well aware of companies,
products, employers, even CEOs who have been cancelled or otherwise penalized. They are
therefore competing to satisfy this demand and to avoid being branded in the wrong way. They are
looking to get ahead of competitors, to be more socially responsible, more forward-thinking and acting about EESG. Contrary to the hypothesis that EESG is a product of market power, massive,
near monopolistic market power is just about the only company feature that can thwart EESG.
Only the Amazons, the Googles and Facebooks of the world can afford not to promptly bend to
these forces. That’s not to suggest that they are actively interested in opposing these forces, it’s
just that they, unlike most companies, cannot be immediately harmed by them. Contrast that with,
for example, Everlane, which went from $50 million in revenue to a $15 million drop in profits
after accusations of ethical violations emerged. 124
The bottom line is that, contrary to some predictions, the demand for EESG and
stakeholderism is not coming from managers seeking to weaken shareholder power and assert
their own interests and prerogatives. It is coming from the ground up, from Millennial employees,
consumers, and investors. Far from empowering managers, it is making them weaker, more
vulnerable, more beholden to more stakeholders than before, an argument we develop in the next
section.
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III. The Millennial Corporation - Managers’ New Boss
As the previous parts have shown, Millennials’ commitment to values translates to the
bottom line of firms’ performance. These effects, we argue, have fundamentally changed the balance
of power within firms. Part A argues that the collective action problem is rooted in shareholder
preferences to maximize returns. Part B shows that millennials exert pressure and discipline on
management through four different channels. Part C demonstrates that millennial preferences have
effects on board diversity and the climate. To summarize, this part will show how the millennials
operate to promote ESG and to discipline managers.

A. The Classic Corporation & Stakeholderism
Under the classical analysis of the corporation, managers were subject primarily to the power
of the owners of the firms, the individual shareholders. These shareholders maximized returns
exclusively. And since ownership is dispersed, shareholders suffered a severe collective action
problem. 125 Shareholders had no incentive to be active as they could rarely influence firms and had
little to gain from such influence. 126 Consequently, there was little that shareholders could do to
discipline managers, who had some incentives to increase firm value, but stronger incentives to
maximize their personal gains instead. 127
Similarly, even large and powerful index funds like the Big Three, who manage shareholder
money, had weak incentives to exercise that power to check and discipline managers. 128 While the
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big three index funds - BlackRock, StateStreet and Vanguard - had plenty of voting power to
influence firms, their managers reaped no rewards from being active. Fund managers’ compensation
was historically designed to reward assets under management not changes to the portfolio's value. 129
Furthermore, if the value of the firms in BlackRock’s portfolio increased, so did that of rivals State
Street and Vanguard, as they all owned the same assets. 130 Thus, they gained nothing from being
active, in fact, activism would confer identical benefits on their competitors, creating a classic freerider problem. 131
Under this classic account of the corporation, in which managers had only weak incentives
to improve shareholder value, they had no incentives to improve stakeholder value. In fact, as
current critics of stakeholderism point out, stakeholderism was invoked primarily as a tool to further
insulate managers from shareholder pressure. This was the case for the “other constituency statutes”
that Bebchuk, Kastiel & Tallarita deploy as evidence that stakeholderism won’t work. 132 These
statutes, which allowed managers to consider the interests of other constituencies (like employees
and suppliers), were used primarily to fight hostile bidders who offered shareholders a premium for
selling their stock. 133

B. Millennial - Incentives to protect stakeholders & Decreased Insulation
The Millennial Corporation, this Part will argue, stands in sharp contrast to the classical
corporation just described. In the Millennial Corporation, managers face discipline from several
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important and significant channels. Section 1 will discuss how the different markets in which
Millennials operate - products, employment and investment - create incentives for managers to
promote stakeholderism. Section 2 will discuss how index funds discipline managers with respect
to stakeholderism, and Section 3 will show how even hedge funds have started running EESGfocused campaigns against management, using EESG as a leverage to nominate directors to the
board.

1. Channel I: Market Discipline
The collective action problem is rooted in shareholders’ preferences to maximize returns
exclusively. When the goal is to maximize returns, it is not rational for an individual shareholder to
invest in activism. Since that shareholder owns only a fraction of each firm, the costs of activism
outweigh any potential benefits (and the likelihood of successful activism is close to zero).
Millennials, on the other hand, are committed to their values, which they might prioritize over
returns. 134 Furthermore, consuming and working in firms they value is important for their identity.
As a result, millennials’ preference for value consumption and employment is not conditioned on
having influence on firms. Put differently, each millennial will do so even if others do not.
Paradoxically, this very feature of Millennial behavior is what gives it such influence. It further
reduces the collective action problem. 135
Managers receive materials from marketing firms and other industry players regarding this
millennial demand for EESG. Even if it is not clear how millennials might act, or whether they will
act, managers may rationally choose, in the absence of contrary evidence, to take that risk seriously.
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Especially as they observe repeat examples of firms that were criticized, penalized or even
boycotted. Thus managers face a new power, a groundswell of bottom-up demand from their
consumers, employees and investors. Failure to respond to that demand could have negative
consequences. Furthermore, millennials know how to monitor. 136 They demand transparency and
they want to analyze the hard data. They are not easily fooled by claims, or virtue- signaling
declarations. Part of their culture is to follow up and verify commitment and compliance, and
publicly calling out someone not living up to their own rhetoric can earn Millennials credit and
prestige in ways that were not true for prior generations. 137
Finally, managers’ careers and personal wealth are tied to the success of their company. If
their firm is targeted by cancel culture for example, the CEO's personal wealth and career trajectory
are at risk. More important, this risk is non-diversifiable. This risk aversion costs further motivate
managers to invest (even excessively) in EESG.
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As we described in our prior paper, Millennials’ pressure on managers is also felt indirectly
through a separate channel, the activism of the big three index funds - Blackrock, State Street and
Vanguard. These funds engage in vigorous competition to be branded as EESG promoters in order
to attract and retain millennials as investors. 139 In particular, we show that while these funds haven’t
used their power and stewardship to protect shareholder value and maximize their portfolios, 140 they
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became highly active with respect to EESG causes. 141 As we found, the big three have also voted
systematically against board members for lack of diversity on their boards. 142 State Street started
the Fearless Girl campaign that pressured firms to add female board members and simultaneously
voted against nomination committees of all-male boards. 143 BlackRock then raised the stakes,
adopting a policy demanding at least two female board members and voting against noncompliance. 144
Since we published our paper, the big three have continued and intensified their EESG
activism. For example, the big three recently turned their efforts to pressure firms to improve board
racial and ethnic diversity. 145 In the early part of 2021, Blackrock voted against 130 boards based
on lack of diversity. During 2020-21 it voted globally against 1,862 board members based on lack
of diversity, 146 and, overall it voted against reelection of 10% of the 64,000 directors it voted on,
voting against at least one director in more than 3,000 firms, due to corporate governance
concerns. 147
Similarly, State Street recently announced it will vote against chairs of nomination
committees in boards that do not have at least one member from underrepresented communities by
the end of the year. 148 And it has already voted against nomination committees chairs based on lack
of disclosure of the ethnic and racial composition of their boards. 149
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Most firms now have majority voting rules which require that board members running
unopposed who receive more votes against than in favor submit their resignation to the board.150
While the board may choose to renominate the director who did not receive support from a majority
of the votes, 151 the board is also required to address the source of shareholder dissatisfaction, or else
may face a negative ISS recommendation in the next annual election. 152
The big three also exert significant pressure on managers to achieve environmental goals,
and accordingly voted against directors for environmental reasons. As Andy Behar, CEO of As You
Sow, a shareholder advocacy non-profit, reflects on the big three activism: “This idea that boards
of directors are these sacred institutions that can’t be touched is done.” 153 Furthermore, index funds’
activism is not limited to annual elections. Recently they increased their support for shareholder
proposals, breaking from their decades-long practice of supporting management. During the recent
proxy season, BlackRock supported more than half of the environmental shareholder proposals it
voted on. 154 These proposals request firms to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, 155 report
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154
Id. (“BlackRock backed 64% of the 72 environment-related shareholder proposals it voted on globally,”)
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BlackRock Investment Stewardship, Vote Bulletin, Chevron Corporation, Item 4: Reduce Scope 3 Emissions
(FOR).
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publication/2021-voting-spotlight-full-report.pdf
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progress in achieving environmental targets, 156 and report lobbying payments. 157 Thus, managers
also face pressure to implement the request in these shareholder proposals. While these proposals
are precatory, not implementing a proposal that received support from a majority of the shareholders
leads to a negative ISS voting recommendation in annual elections. 158 That’s what gives them teeth.
Finally as shown in the next section, the big three also gave their support to Engine 1 , a
small hedge fund that targeted Exxon Mobile with an EESG focused proxy fight, and won.

3. Channel III: Hedge Fund ESG Activism
Millennials’ pressure on management is felt through another major channel - hedge fund
activism. For well over a decade, activist hedge funds have become the main threat to managers.
Recently, their main strategy has been to run director nominees to the board. 159 Whether they
succeed depends, to a large extent, on the support of the large index funds. 160 Opponents of
stakeholderism have argued that management will use the stakeholderism rhetoric to get the support
of institutions in their fight against activist hedge funds, 161 to “ urge institutional investors to avoid
cooperating with hedge fund activists and to side with and support corporate leaders.“ 162

156

BlackRock Investment Stewardship, Vote Bulletin, General Electric Corporation, Item 7: Report on Meeting the
Criteria of the Net Zero Indicator (FOR)
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publication/2021-voting-spotlight-full-report.pdf
157
BlackRock Investment Stewardship, Vote Bulletin Exxon Mobile, Item 9: Report on Lobbying Payments and
Policy (FOR)
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publication/2021-voting-spotlight-full-report.pdf
158
ISS Proxy Voting Guidelines Benchmark Policy Recommendations, Voting for Director Nominees in Uncontested
Elections, Responsiveness, p.12 (2021) (ISS may recommend voting against directors if “The board failed to act on a
shareholder proposal that received the support of a majority of the shares cast in the previous year…”).
https://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/active/americas/US-Voting-Guidelines.pdf
159
Bebchuk & Tallarita
160
Id.
161
Id. (“Stakeholderism has been used to urge institutional investors to be more deferential to corporate leaders and
more willing to side with them in any engagement with hedge fund activists”)
162
Id. at 158.
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In reality, however, the evidence points in the exact opposite direction. Not only does
EESG fail to help managers fend off activists, rather, activist hedge funds use EESG to win indexfund support against managers. That was clearly the case in the most high profile fight of the 2021
proxy season, when a small startup fund, Engine No. 1, gained three board seats on ExxonMobil
board after a proxy campaign focused on climate change. 163
To be sure, Exxon was a candidate for a traditional activist attack after losing _ of its
market value following the pandemic and the fall of oil and gas prices globally. Yet, Engine’s
success shocked markets. 164 It won because of its focus on EESG. 165 A small, relatively new
fund, Engine held only a tiny fraction of Exxon - a $40M stake, 166 hardly a fifth of one percent of
Exxon’s outstanding stock. 167 Furthermore, the campaign that placed three out of the fund’s four
nominees on Exxon’s board cost $12.5M - a strikingly low number for a proxy fight of this
magnitude, 168 especially compared to Exxon's expenditures. 169 Accordingly, the victory was

163

The Little Engine that Could, ExxonMobil Loses a Proxy Fight with Green Investors, The Economist (May 29,
2021) (“An activist hedge fund succeeds in nominating at least two climate-friendly directors to the energy giant’s
board”).
164
(“The high-profile ExxonMobil shareholder vote in May sent shock waves through many of corporate America’s
boardrooms”)
165
David A. Katz and Laura A. McIntosh, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, EESG Activism After ExxonMobil, Harv.
L. Sch. F. on Corp. Gov. (July 23, 2021).
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/07/23/eesg-activism-after-exxonmobil/
166
Robert G. Eccles & Colin Mayer, Can a Tiny Hedge Fund Push ExxonMobil Towards Sustainability?, Har. Bus.
Rev. (Jan. 20, 2021).
https://hbr.org/2021/01/can-a-tiny-hedge-fund-push-exxonmobile-towards-sustainability
For comparison, other activist hedge funds that placed a slate in high visibility proxy fights - _____
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Thomas Ball, James Miller, and Shirley Westcott, Alliance Advisors, Was the Exxon Fight a Bellwether?, Harv. L.
Sch. F. on Corp. Gov. (July 24, 2021) (“Engine No. 1 launched in December with approximately $250 million in
assets, and owned 0.02% of Exxon’s outstanding shares”).
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/07/24/was-the-exxon-fight-a-bellwether/#4
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Svea Herbst-bayliss, Little Engine No. 1 Beat Exxon with Just $12.5 Mln, Reuters (June 30, 2021) (“Investors said
the fund's small budget could become a template for low-cost proxy contests”)
https://www.reuters.com/business/little-engine-no-1-beat-exxon-with-just-125-mln-sources-2021-06-29/
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described as not less than “shocking”, 170 “David against Goliath”, 171 “the Little Engine that
Could”, 172 and “The most groundbreaking development this proxy season” 173
Industry players explained Engine 1’s win as a result of its unique strategy to use EESG as
a leverage. 174 A Wachtell Lipton memo explains: 175
While there were various factors at play in the ExxonMobil scenario, the bottom
line is this: A newly launched and virtually unknown hedge fund with a tiny stake
in a massive global enterprise managed to leverage environmental and governance
issues into winning three board seats at the annual meeting, displacing three
incumbent directors, and is now in a position to influence the strategic direction of
the company. 176
The NYTimes echoes this view in a column titled “Exxon’s Board Defeat Signals the Rise of
Social-Good Activists”:
Indeed, Engine reminded BlackRock, Vanguard and State Street that its campaign
was in line with their own publicly stated goals to see the carbon emissions of the
companies in their portfolios fall sharply over the next 30 years. 177
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Svea Herbst-bayliss, Little Engine No. 1 Beat Exxon with Just $12.5 Mln, Reuters (June 30, 2021) (“Engine No. 1
in May shocked the oil-and-gas industry”) https://www.reuters.com/business/little-engine-no-1-beat-exxon-with-just125-mln-sources-2021-06-29/
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See e.g. Peter Georgescu, EN1 Versus Exxon: This David Wants To Strengthen His Goliath,
Just Capital, Forbes (April 30 2021) https://www.forbes.com/sites/justcapital/2021/04/30/en1-versus-exxon-thisdavid-wants-to-strengthen-his-goliath/?sh=407d9c47e396
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The Little Engine that Could, ExxonMobil Loses a Proxy Fight with Green Investors, The Economist (May 29,
2021)
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Thomas Ball, James Miller, and Shirley Westcott, Alliance Advisors, Was the Exxon Fight a Bellwether?, Harv. L.
Sch. F. on Corp. Gov. (July 24, 2021)
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/07/24/was-the-exxon-fight-a-bellwether/#4.
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See e.g., Lindsay Frost, Activist Hedge Funds Increasingly EESG Converts, Agenda (July 26, 2021) (“Whereas
before an activist investor had to reflect more ownership, Engine No. 1 has shown that a smaller position, coupled with
a compelling EESG issue, could be sufficient to win a campaign for a board seat (or four). Boards cannot afford to
ignore the issues raised by activists, even little-known funds.”)
https://www.agendaweek.com/c/3253704/411854?referrer_module=searchSubFromAG&highlight=exxon
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David A. Katz and Laura A. McIntosh, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, EESG Activism After ExxonMobil, Harv.
L. Sch. F. on Corp. Gov. (July 23, 2021),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/07/23/eesg-activism-after-exxonmobil/.
176
Id.
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Matt Phillips, Exxon’s Board Defeat Signals the Rise of Social-Good Activists, N.Y. Times (June 9, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/09/business/exxon-mobil-engine-no1-activist.html [https://perma.cc/6U7J-FP5J].
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BlackRock voted for three out of Engine’s four candidates, explaining that ”...we believe
more needs to be done in Exxon’s long-term strategy and short-term actions in relation to the
energy transition in order to mitigate the impact of climate risk on long-term shareholder
value.“ 178
As this activist hedge fund campaign demonstrates, in contrast to the predictions of the
reactionary managers camp, managers did not use stakeholderism to fight off hedge fund activism.
Quite the contrary, activist hedge funds used EESG as leverage to get support from index funds
for their board candidates. And as analysts opined, “it’s hard to overstate the impact that Exxon’s
defeat will have on corporations across the country.” 179 There is no doubt that other hedge funds
will go this route, 180 and receive enthusiastic support from the institutions. 181
As the Engine campaign shows, since hedge funds now can use EESG as leverage in their
fights with management, and might get the institutions to support their candidates, managers are
less insulated and more exposed to hedge fund attacks. As an immediate result, managers have to
take EESG seriously and constantly invest in it and improve it.

178

Press Release, BlackRock, Vote Bulletin: ExxonMobil Corporation (May 26, 2021), (“Exxon and its Board need to
further assess the company’s strategy and board expertise against the possibility that demand for fossil fuels may
decline rapidly in the coming decades, as was recently discussed in the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) Net Zero
2050 scenario. The company’s current reluctance to do so presents a corporate governance issue that has the potential
to undermine the company’s long-term financial sustainability.”)
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/press-release/blk-vote-bulletin-exxon-may-2021.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4L38-NLE9].
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Matt Phillips, Exxon’s Board Defeat Signals the Rise of Social-Good Activists, N.Y. Times (June 9, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/09/business/exxon-mobil-engine-no1-activist.html [https://perma.cc/6U7J-FP5J].
180
Thomas Ball, James Miller, and Shirley Westcott, Alliance Advisors, Was the Exxon Fight a Bellwether?, Harv. L.
Sch. F. on Corp. Gov. (July 24, 2021) (“There is little doubt that Engine No. 1’s victory in the Exxon proxy fight will
embolden other investors to launch board contests in the future that focus on E&S issues.”).
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But it is critically important to emphasize that the Engine No. 1 campaign did not stop at
EESG. Rather, the campaign included other, non-EESG demands of the type that are common to
activists’ campaigns. 182 Activist hedge funds typically target firms which they believe invest
excessively and pressure management to cut investments and instead distribute some money to
shareholders. Accordingly, in its letter to management, Engine No. 1 argued that management
should cut some non-profitable investments. 183 Furthermore, in its letter to management, Engine
promoted a classic hedge fund intervention in CEO pay, tying it to shareholder value and cutting it
based on Exxon’s recent performance.

184

Thus, Engine’s activism showed that activists can actually use EESG as leverage to reduce
management insulation, even for issues beyond the realm of stakeholderism, such as firms’ capital
investment, and even beyond that, to intervene in executive compensation, the heart of managerial
incentives. This defied the predictions of the reactionary managers camp.
4. Channel IV: Regulation - Nasdaq Diversity Listing Rules

Millennial preferences are also reshaping regulation. On August 6, 2021 the SEC approved
Nasdaq’s board diversity listing standards. These standards require boards to publicly disclose
board-level diversity statistics and to have at least two diverse members or explain why they do

182

See, e.g., Peter Georgescu, EN1 Versus Exxon: This David Wants To Strengthen His Goliath,
Just Capital, Forbes (April 30, 2021), https://www.forbes.com/sites/justcapital/2021/04/30/en1-versus-exxon-thisdavid-wants-to-strengthen-his-goliath/?sh=407d9c47e396 (“But James is suggesting immediate changes in the way
Exxon handles money and his ideas will bring smiles to those who care about little more than dividends and earnings
per share.”).
183
Id. (“He has a specific request to fund only projects that can break even on the assumption of conservative oil and
gas prices.”).
184
Id. (“EN1 would like to change executive compensation to align it more closely with shareholder value. That’s a
nice way of saying the CEO has been grossly overpaid.”).
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not. 185 During the comment period, the SEC received 200 submissions, out of which 85 percent
supported the rules (Comments submitted to the SEC become public immediately.). 186 Not
surprisingly, firms that cater to millennials publicized their support. For example, Robin Hood
CEO Wes Moore wrote in his comment, in support of the Nasdaq Rule, 187 “Corporations that lead
on equity and inclusion become more durable, have greater resonance with America’s diverse
consumer markets, and are more creative and competitive in the global marketplace.” 188
As noted, the rule requires firms to disclose information on their board diversity. As stated
by SEC chair Gary Gensler : 189

These rules reflect calls from investors for greater transparency about the people who
lead public companies, and a broad cross-section of commenters supported the
proposed board diversity disclosure rule. Investors are looking for consistent and
comparable data when making decisions about their investments. I believe that our
markets work best when investors have access to such information. 190
In opposing the rule, Republicans from the Senate Banking committee argued that mandatory
disclosure of diversity could be used by activist groups to pressure firms to make changes:

NASDAQ’s alternative to satisfying the quota requirement—disclosure explaining
non- compliance—could still hurt companies even if they do not change their

185

Nasdaq’s Board Diversity Rule What Nasdaq-Listed Companies Should Know,
https://listingcenter.nasdaq.com/assets/Board%20Diversity%20Disclosure%20Five%20Things.pdf (last updated Aug.
6, 2021).
186
Comments on NASDAQ Rulemaking, US Securities and Exchange Commission,
https://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-nasdaq-2020-081/srnasdaq2020081.htm ().
187
Katherine Doherty and Jeff Green,Nasdaq Wins SEC Support for Plan to Diversify Company Boards
Bloomberg News (August 6, 2021)
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behavior. Activist groups could use the information to start costly pressure
campaigns against corporations with allegedly non-diverse boards. NASDAQ
appears to acknowledge this by quoting your earlier remarks that transparency
‘creates external pressure from investors and others who can draw comparisons
company to company.’ 191
This development contradicts a second prediction of the reactionary managers camp. Far
from preempting new regulation, the new drive for EESG prompted it. 192 Millennial pressure is
affecting more than just corporate managers and investment managers. It is affecting regulators
too. 193

C. Millennial EESG Activism Has Effects Both Inside the Corporate World and
Beyond
1. Effects on Diversity
The rise of the Millennials hasn’t just led to much more talk about boardroom diversity. It
has led to much more boardroom diversity. In 2017, the Big Three index funds began actively
pushing for more women to be hired on corporate boards. The results have been immediate and
dramatic, which is hardly surprising, given that the Big Three hold XX% of the market. According
to one recent study, the Big Three’s campaign in favor of board gender diversity lead firms to add
more female directors,

194

and to promote female directors to key positions on the board. 195

191

https://www.banking.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/NASDAQ_LETTER.pdf
See Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note __.
193
Alexandra Olson, SEC approves Nasdaq’s plan to require board diversity, AP News (August 7, 2021)
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CEO of the women’s workplace advocacy group Catalyst, said Nasdaq’s plan was a reasonable response to a desire
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194
See Todd A. Gormley, Visha K. Gupta, David A. Matsa, Sandra Mortal & Lukai Yang, The Big Three and Board
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Working Paper 714/2020, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3724653 (“We estimate that their
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Millennials’ fight for racial diversity has also started showing results. 196 The share of new
directors in S&P 500 firms who are Black has tripled from 11% in 2020 to 33% in 2021, 197 an
unprecedented jump in the data, according to Julie Daum, the North American board practice
leader for Spencer Stuart. 198 Daum, ISS and other commentators, all attribute this jump in the data
to the murder of George Floyd and the Black Lives Matter protests in the summer of 2020. 199
That’s not to say that diversity on U.S. corporate boards has been achieved. Far from it. 200
But these changes are significant. Overall 456 directors were nominated this year, the largest
number of new nominations since 2004. 201 Almost three quarters (72%) of the new directors that
were nominated in 2021 are women or belong to a racial or ethnic minority; the share of new
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Catherine Thorbecke, Boardroom diversity is on the rise after racial reckoning hits private sector, study finds,
ABC News (June 16, 2021, 2:04 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/Business/boardroom-diversity-rise-racial-reckoninghits-private-sector/story?id=78312353.
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198
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Finds, ABC News (June 16, 2021) (“Daum said most companies tend to start looking for new directors in September,
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U.S. Companies, ISS Press Release (May 25, 2021) (“The spike follows widespread racial justice protests last
summer that, in turn, prompted many U.S. corporate leaders to pledge to increase the number of Black directors and
executives within corporate ranks.)
200
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Black/African American, Hispanic/Latino/a, Asian, American Indian/Native Alaskan or multiracial ... And women
now represent 30% of all S&P 500 directors). Furthermore, there are less achievements in small firms. See generally
Kobi Kastiel & Yaron Nilli, The Corporate Governance Gap, 131 Yale L. J. (Forthcoming 2022)
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3824857
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https://www.wsj.com/articles/this-years-influx-of-directors-starts-shift-in-boardroom-diversity11623835801?mod=pls_whats_news_us_business_f

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3918443

directors who are Latino or Hispanic has more than doubled, rising from 3% in 2020 to 7% in
2021; and the total share of new directors from racial or ethnic minorities has almost doubled from
21% in 2020 to 47% in 2021. 202Overall 2021 saw the most diverse incoming class of directors in
history. 203
2. Effects on Climate
The evidence shows that Millennials are reshaping the corporation and the investment
space. Even more remarkably, a recent study found that the climate campaigns by the big three
achieved meaningful environmental results. 204 The study used novel data on engagements of the
big three with individual firms in their portfolio and found that the funds targeted large firms with
high CO2 emission in which they held large stakes. 205 The study also found evidence consistent
with the hypothesis that the funds’ efforts were effective. In particular, the study found a strong
and statistically significant negative association between ownership by the big three and carbon
emissions. 206 Importantly, consistent with causal connection, this effect became stronger in recent
years, after the funds launched their public climate campaigns. 207
There is also apparent progress on other dimensions such as disclosure. BlackRock reported
that 65% of the 224 firms it targeted for climate change issues have “made progress on integrating
climate risk into business strategy and disclosures.” 208
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IV. Implications
Our account of the Millennial corporation has important implications for corporate law and
finance. In this section we characterize these implications. Section A discusses implications for
securities law, and in particular to disclosure and materiality doctrine. Section B discusses
implications for corporate law, with a focus on managers’ fiduciary duties. Section C discusses
the relationship between EESG and firm performance. Section D discusses implications for firms.
We end this Part with a discussion, in Section E, of how the rise of Millennial stakeholders affects
our understanding of the firm.
For decades, corporate governance scholarship has been dominated by a debate which pits
shareholder primacy versus stakeholderism. Shareholder primacy holds that the purpose of the
firm is to maximize returns to shareholders, while stakeholderism asserts that firms should have
commitments to non-shareholder stakeholders as well. Neither doctrine is particularly helpful in
explaining the Millennial corporation, because it is characterized by preferences that overlap
across traditional stakeholder categories like consumer, employee, and shareholder.

A. Can Securities Law Keep Pace?
Companies’ disclosures to investors have become one of the key fronts in the debate over
EESG. Investors have demanded more details about firms’ performance with respect to
environmental and social metrics and argued that these disclosures are essential to their asset
allocation decisions. With new appointments to the Securities and Exchange Commission early in
the Biden administration, the SEC has made developing new disclosure guidelines related to
climate change a priority. These new requirements are now the subject of a vigorous debate. The
disclosure debate mirrors the larger one: Are these new disclosures an essential ingredient in
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accurately pricing firms, or is this an attempt to turn America’s securities regulator into a tool of
social change? 209
In this part we argue that financial disclosures need to keep pace with the changing nature
of corporate governance. The idea that financially material disclosures can be clearly
distinguished from politically motivated disclosure requirements is less tenable when firms find
themselves financially affected by perceptions of their social and environmental responsibility.
Stakeholder power is leading to a convergence of the political and the financial, and one of the
main consequences is that social issues can become financial problems in short order. Drawing
distinctions between financial and social motivations is becoming increasingly pointless and
untenable. Instead, regulators should be asking whether the demanded disclosures are actually
something most investors want.

Even before the SEC engaged with the issue, many of the largest firms had already begun
to make voluntary EESG disclosures. Frameworks like SASB and GRI provide guidelines for
firms to voluntarily make structure disclosures on EESG issues in standardized ways, akin to what
investors might receive in a 10-K. Many companies go beyond even these voluntary disclosure
frameworks to produce lengthy reports that outline their EESG goals and metrics. And as noted
above, some have adopted the concept of “radical transparency” to cater to Millennials and Gen Z
and to win points on websites like Good On You that have become a quasi-ISS for consumers who
value EESG.

209

Paul G. Mahoney & Julia D. Mahoney, The New Separation of Ownership and Control: Institutional Investors and
ESG, forthcoming Columbia Business Law Review (2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3809914 (last visited
Aug. 11, 2021).
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i. Stakeholder Interest Convergence at the SEC: Human Capital Management
To illustrate how pressure from Millennial stakeholders is changing disclosure obligations,
consider the new Human Capital Management disclosure obligations. This new disclosure rule is
typical of the debate over the role of the SEC in EESG issues. Effective November 9, 2020, the
SEC expanded the obligations of registrants to make disclosures regarding their “human capital”
under Item 101(c)(1)(xiii) of Regulation S-K. 210 Prior to the adoption of this new rule, the SEC
had only required registrants to disclose the number of employees. The revision to the disclosure
requirement now calls on companies to include in their filings:
“A description of the registrant’s human capital resources, including the number of persons
employed by the registrant, and any human capital measures or objectives that the
registrant focuses on in managing the business (such as, depending on the nature of the
registrant’s business and workforce, measures or objectives that address the development,
attraction and retention of personnel).” 211
The emphasis on, not just the numerical size of the workforce, but on firms’ relationship to their
employees—including attraction and retention—is a result of investors’ growing awareness that a
firm’s relationship to its employees is an essential ingredient to both returns-oriented and sociallyoriented EESG investors.
The expansion of disclosure related to human capital was in part a response to a
rulemaking petition from the Human Capital Management Coalition, an organization of investors
including mostly union pension funds as well as some private asset managers. 212 The petition
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made the case for the increasing importance of employee talent to investors, noting that SASB had
highlighted human capital issues as material to a number of industries.
Larry Fink of Blackrock explicitly addressed human capital in his 2020 letter:
“Companies ignore stakeholders at their peril – companies that do not earn this trust will
find it harder and harder to attract customers and talent, especially as young people
increasingly expect companies to reflect their values. The more your company can show
its purpose in delivering value to its customers, its employees, and its communities, the
better able you will be to compete and deliver long-term, durable profits for
shareholders….
A company that does not seek to benefit from the full spectrum of human talent is weaker
for it – less likely to hire the best talent, less likely to reflect the needs of its customers
and the communities where it operates, and less likely to outperform….
[W]e ask that your disclosures on talent strategy fully reflect your long-term plans to
improve diversity, equity, and inclusion, as appropriate by region.” 213
Several features of Fink’s letter are notable. First is the explicit connection between the need to
attract and retain talent and the expectation of “young people” that companies will reflect their
values. Second is the emphasis on delivering value to “employees and customers.” In framing
the issue this way, Fink implicitly recognizes the convergence in interests in stakeholders as
customers, stakeholders as employees. The entire statement, of course, is coming from a firm
whose stakeholder role is as an investor, and we have argued elsewhere that firms like Blackrock
are internalizing the interests of their younger investors. 214
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The response of firms to the new disclosure requirements is telling. While some firms
have given fairly bare-bones disclosures, 215 others have taken the opportunity to outline their
approach to managing human capital risks in detail. Starbucks, for example, wrote in it’s 10-K:
“We recognize the diversity of customers, partners and communities, and believe in
creating an inclusive and equitable environment that represents a broad spectrum of
backgrounds and cultures. Working under these principles, our Partner Resources
Organization is tasked with managing employment-related matters, including recruiting
and hiring, onboarding and training, compensation planning, performance management
and professional development. Our Board of Directors and Board committees provide
oversight on certain human capital matters, including our Inclusion and Diversity
programs and initiatives.” 216
Starbucks goes on to outline several board committees and their specific roles in addressing
human capital issues, their approach to salaries and benefits, including specifically outlining
initiatives related to employee mental health. 217
SEC-mandated disclosures are not the only area of significant changes in how firms speak
to investors about their employees. A significant number of large public companies have agreed
to begin disclosing detailed EE0-1 data, in part reflecting pressure from the New York City
Comptroller’s office. 218 Companies are required to submit these reports to the U.S. Equal
Opportunity Employment Commission. While firms have long been required to assemble these
detailed reports, which include breakdowns of rank-and-file employees by race and gender across
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different job types, these companies are not agreeing to disclose this information to investors.
These reports therefore provide a concrete numerical backdrop to Larry Fink’s request, noted
above, for companies to discuss long term plans to increase diversity, and the SEC’s principlesbased disclosure on human capital. Since companies already have this data, and investors are
increasingly treating diversity as a material issue, it is hard for companies to resist investor
requests to make it public.
It is important to recognize the convergence in interests across stakeholder groups.
Diversity also matters because prospective employees increasingly value diversity in the
workforce and want to work for diverse companies. Those employees, of course, are themselves
the retirement savers whose money BlackRock seeks. Moreover, a lack of workforce diversity
has the potential to become an issue for consumers, as the Adidas case vividly illustrates. 219 The
point is that these investors, consumers, and employees are not distinct groups of individuals,
they are the same individuals interacting with companies in various ways, but with a willingness
to foreground their values in these various roles.
Despite the fact that investors are seeking increased disclosures and many firms are
sharing more with investors than the SEC requires, some have objected to the SEC’s human
capital disclosures as outside the purview of the SEC. A comment letter from the Heritage
Foundation argued that “[R]hetorical obfuscation notwithstanding, the goal of proponents of
ESG, CSR, SRI, sustainability requirements, diversity requirements or stakeholder theory is not
to increase corporate profits but to instead alter corporate behavior by legislative, regulatory or
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other means in furtherance of some (or many) social or political objectives … [N]owhere in the
mission of the Commission is found a reference to furthering any social, environmental or other
factor.” 220
Our main objection to the Heritage critique is not that it is inaccurate. Rather, it fails to
acknowledge that we now live in a world where at least some investors prioritize goals other than
maximizing returns. While it is true that some EESG investors argue that EESG maximizes
returns, we believe a significant cohort of investors care about their social goals at least as much,
if not more than, returns, just as there are employees who opt to earn less to work in a sustainable
business, and consumers who will pay more for a sustainable product. When the investor utility
function includes returns but also maximizing social goals, materiality starts to look a little
different. Deciding whether something is a social issue or a business issue matters less if your
investors care about that issue, and we think the SEC should (and already is) abandoning the
effort to try. In this instance, employee relationships are critical to the success of most modern
companies for both traditional business and for social reasons.. We advance an understanding of
the human capital disclosure requirement that foregrounds the increasing importance of
employee-relations of a successful firm. It recognizes the expanding phenomenon of employee
and customer stakeholders eager to integrate social values into their economic life. Investors with
multiple preferences are merely responding to stakeholders’ ability to exercise power within the
firm by seeking disclosure that helps manage those risks, and the SEC is merely responding to
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investors’ changing understanding of what types of risks matter, and what types of preferences
investors have. 221

iii. Materiality
There is a temptation to interpret the rise of EESG investing through the shareholderstakeholder frame that has long-dominated discussion of corporations’ social role. As we have
argued, we think that this is not the right approach, not because that distinction has been rendered
meaningless, but because its explanatory power breaks down when stakeholders have otherregarding preferences. 222 Similarly, drawing on notions of “corporate purpose” seems to miss the
thrust of these changes. In our view, corporations are simply trying to navigate the world as they
find it rather than fundamentally rethink the nature of the firm.
The notion that a corporation must consider the interests of all of its stakeholders to create
value for shareholders is not new. Indeed, Bebchuck and Tallaitta dub it “enlightened shareholder
value” and take a largely nothing-new-here approach to it. 223 Maximizing profit by responding to
the social preferences of employees and consumers is still maximizing profit, after all, and that is
what corporations have always done.
In our view, though, something fundamental has changed, and that change has important
implications. Many investors prioritize social objectives for the purpose of attaining those social
objectives, while others prioritize the same because they believe it maximizes returns. It is
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exceedingly difficult to regulate information disclosure by trying to discern when the information
is wanted for profit maximization versus some overlapping or alternative purpose. Regardless, in a
world in which consumers and employees are sensitive to the social implications of corporate
behavior, and that sensitivity can result in dramatic effects on brand value, employee retention,
and ultimately profit, investors must worry about a dramatically expanded universe of risks, and
the information firms provide investors should change accordingly. In short, we need an expanded
concept of materiality.

Materiality is a core concept in securities regulation. In the presence of a duty to disclose,
companies must share material information with the market that would assume actual significance
in the mind of a reasonable investor. 224 Millennial preferences should force a re-reckoning with
traditional notions of materiality, as these preferences are altering what kind of information socalled reasonable investors would deem to be important. Courts should not be too quick to dismiss
disclosures about social or environmental issues merely because such disclosures would not have
ordinarily been understood to relate to a company’s financials. If courts lag investors in
understanding the connection between stakeholder preferences and firm performance, or--worse-if such disclosures are dismissed as puffery, then investors risk being left in the dark. Instead,
courts should follow investors’ lead, and adopt a flexible notion of materiality that is responsive to
investors changing needs for information.

B.
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In the prior section, we examined the securities law implications of Millennial preferences.
Here we describe their implications in the corporate space, particularly with regard to fiduciary
duties. In many ways, the analysis remains largely the same as it is for securities law, applied in
the corporate law context. Just as the kinds of information that investors consider material has
changed, so the kinds of information we should expect boards to receive, review, and analyze
should alter our notions of fiduciary duty.
The ideology of shareholder primacy long associated with Milton Friedman has also held
sway in corporate law for decades, as nicely captured in the opening quotation of this article.
Many have argued over the years that Delaware law requires companies to maximize shareholder
value (at least without breaking the law). More recently, as shareholder primacy has come under
increasing attack, so has the view that the law requires it. Former Chief Justice of the Delaware
Supreme Court Leo E. Strine, Jr. has recently argued in two articles that EESG is consistent with
Delaware fiduciary duties along several dimensions. One article conceptualizes EESG as “an
extension of the board’s duty to implement and monitor a compliance program under
Caremark.” 225 That is, EESG should be situated within the compliance function of corporations as
part of a larger effort by which companies seek to abide by legal and ethical requirements in the
conduct of their businesses. “[A]s a matter of practical business strategy, if a company strives to
be an above-average corporate citizen, then it will also be much more likely to simultaneously
meet its minimum legal and regulatory duties.” A second piece, co-authored by Strine and Chris
Brummer, argues that corporate fiduciary duties are consistent with efforts aimed at diversity,
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equity, and inclusion as a means to comply with civil rights and anti-discrimination laws and
norms. 226
We don’t object to these accounts and in large part agree with them. But in our view, the
Millennial and Gen Z demand for EESG and DEI are already driving corporate efforts past what is
strictly required by corporate, environmental, civil rights, or antidiscrimination law. Many
corporate actions that would be in perfect compliance with the law would be so repugnant to
Millennials and Gen Z that they could be devastating to the company. If you consider the many
examples cited above, all caused corporate harm. None were illegal. To some extent, we are more
concerned with courts or regulators inefficiently obstructing the rise of EESG than we are with
using it to help companies meet their legal obligations.
Nor are concerns about harm to firm value merely anecdotal. One recent study analyzes
the effect of ESG incidents on firms, over the last ten years. 227 Negative ESG incidents have an
immediate negative effect on firms’ market value and the study found that, following negative
ESG incidents, firms earnings and operational profits declined for years. 228 These results suggest
that at the time of public revelation of the problem, capital markets underestimated the negative
future effects they would have on firms’ performance.
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As is well understood, corporate fiduciary duties are largely vindicated through process.
Bad business outcomes alone cannot be a basis for fiduciary breaches. Business bears well-known
risks, and bad outcomes are part of the game. Still, common sense dictates that bad business
outcomes are more likely to be the ones that wind up in court. When such outcomes arise, courts
often look for what procedures companies had in place to avoid those bad outcomes. Good
procedures often insulate corporate fiduciaries from liability.
Procedures inside the Millennial Corporation necessarily will look somewhat different
from prior corporate iterations. The point being made here is close to our argument for an
expanded concept of materiality. For example, the information one would expect boards and
managers to examine before making significant business decisions should look considerably
different today than it did a decade ago. Not long ago, one might expect companies to be acting
primarily on financial information. But as we have by now made clear, what once would have
counted as hard-nosed business and financial information appropriate for board consideration has
changed. For example, consider revelations about sexual harassment inside the corporation. Such
questions might once have largely have been treated in a narrow “dollars and cents” sense, about
the risks of a lawsuit, the strengths or weaknesses of the case, the costs of settlement and
confidentiality, and so forth. Today, if the extent of a corporate board’s analysis of one sexual
harassment claim were to determine the cost of settlement and confidentiality, it would likely be a
breach of fiduciary duty. Boards should have systems in place for investigating such claims,
discerning their veracity, determining if there are other such claims, making some assessment
about whether the organization fosters a culture of sexual harassment, hiring outside counsel to
investigate, and so forth. All of our evidence strongly suggests that Millennial and Gen Z
investors, consumers, and employees would react with swift outrage against a company whose
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culture tolerated and failed to root out such harassment or worse. This necessarily translates into
judges and courts, for example, seeing an increase in cases in which boards are reviewing and
discussing a far broader range of materials than they might previously have assessed to do their
jobs. Presentations about employee and customer satisfaction, retention and recruitment rates,
sourcing of materials, supply chain issues, social media monitoring and reporting, and so forth. In
short, what once looked like care or prudence has changed.
A second implication for corporate law is the convergence point. While it is not our
argument that distinctions between shareholders, employees, and customers no longer matter, we
make the case that these distinctions are breaking down under the weight of strong Millennial and
Gen Z preferences that transcend them. In a world where shareholder primacy reigned, board
deliberations that focused exclusively on the interests of shareholders would have been
appropriate. Consider a corporate decision to outsource jobs to a factory overseas, one over which
the company has little oversight or control. That decision might once have focused on the ability
of the overseas factory to make the same quality product for less, net of increased shipping costs,
increasing profits by reducing the cost of production. Today, the same decision that would exclude
any assessment of the impact on employees or customers might look like a failure of care, if, for
example, customers revolted either against the harm to employees or perhaps human rights or
child labor abuses at the overseas factory. Convergence requires an expansion of the field of
decisionmaking.
In some respects, changes in the corporate space might be analogized to the transition on
the investor side from the “prudent man” to the “prudent investor” standard. Under the prudent
man standard, a fiduciary would examine each investment on its own merits and avoid speculative
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or risky investments. 230 Interpretations of that standard began to clash with the rise of modern
portfolio theory and diversified investing. Under the prudent man standard, investment in stock
was once viewed as per se risky and a breach of fiduciary duty, but after the inflation of the 1970s,
which punished bonds and rewarded stock, failure to invest in the stock market began to look like
such a breach. In addition, investing in a diversified basket of stocks, in which the fiduciary would
conduct no firm-specific analysis before investing, similarly looked like a breach of the prudent
man rule. A switch to the prudent investor rule accommodated investing in stock and diversified
investment. A transformation of our understanding in what actually served the interests of
beneficiaries in turn transformed the law.

231

Similarly, corporate law precedents that presuppose a world of shareholder primacy may
need to be recast or overruled to accommodate the realities of both stakeholderism and stakeholder
convergence. Precedents that might once have made it difficult for boards to consider the
environment, diversity, or workers rapidly look like they inhibit managers from doing what is
demanded from them by their own stakeholders, including shareholders.

C. A New Framework for Corporate Governance Scholarship

The evidence supports the conclusion that Millennials and GenZ take their mostly left-ofcenter politics with them when they shop, work, and invest. While much of this evidence is selfreported survey evidence, some of it is already showing up in hard data demonstrating that this is
more than just rhetoric. To an extent that was not true for Baby Boomers and GenX, Millennials
are willing to take a paycut, pay more for a product, and accept lower rates of return to promote
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values beyond their own narrow economic advancement. If this is true, it follows that corporations
and their managers often confront stakeholders, primarily employees, customers, and
shareholders, who all want the same thing, say, a company that opts for sustainable business
practices. In our view, one of the most important features of the Millennial Corporation is this
convergence of interests between stakeholders who are often depicted as being adversarial, or at
least mutually exclusive. From a more traditional perspective, shareholders want to pay labor less
and charge customers more to increase profits, labor wants to maximize compensation, customers
want the highest quality product for the lowest price. Under shareholder primacy, managers
should ultimately serve shareholder interests, and under a stakeholder view, managers should be
empowered to mediate between these often competing interests. But in our view, when
stakeholder interests converge, as they often do in the Millennial Corporation, the shareholder
primacy versus stakeholders debate is sapped of explanatory power. Neither adequately explains
socially responsible investing. Both are downstream from a more important phenomenon.
When Amazon dropped Parler, was the company acting in the interests of shareholders? Or
stakeholders more broadly? If the latter, which stakeholders? Was it the high-skilled Amazon
employees who demanded Parler’s removal from the platform because of its tolerance of white
supremacists? Was it Amazon customers who might have taken their business elsewhere for the
same reason? If Amazon would lose skilled employees or customers to competitors by continuing
to host Parler, was it not also in the interest of shareholders to drop it? Would a shareholder
primacy versus stakeholderist framework provide more or less insight into the company’s actions?
If we’re right about Millennials, then neither the shareholder primacy nor stakeholderist
perspectives offer much insight. Who managers prioritize is a purely semantic exercise when your
stakeholders want the same things.
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This position might seem to strengthen the managerialist explanation for the rise of ESG,
as articulated by Bebchuk and others, namely, that socially responsible investing and the departure
from shareholder primacy are means for managers to reassert control over the corporation,
clawing back power from shareholders. According to the managerialists, stakeholderism
empowers managers under the theory that the CEO who has many bosses has no bosses. At the
purely theoretical level, this sounds plausible and attractive. It is true that managers in the past
have sometimes used stakeholderism not to empower employees or customers but to insulate
themselves from accountability to shareholders. But our view of the facts suggests that the rise of
EESG is far from a managerialist plot, or even one that managers are capable of exploiting to their
advantage. If Bebchuk et al were correct, CEO behavior today would be reminiscent of the preshareholder rights revolution days of Jack Welch and Al “Chainsaw” Dunlap. Do today’s CEOs
dealing with Millennials and socially responsible investors remind anyone of the superstar CEO
era when corporate leaders ruled with an iron fist, firing workers by the tens of thousands, hiring
their friends and business school classmates to serve on boards of directors, massively increasing
their own compensation? Far from it. Today’s CEOs are hardly the Pharaohs of yesteryear. They
are, first and foremost, afraid of getting fired.
The reality on the ground suggests that the CEO who has many bosses has many bosses.
In the era of the Millennial Corporation, CEOs have even less power than they did at the peak of
shareholder primacy. CEOs have gone from a constituency of none in the days of the Imperial
CEO, to a constituency of one--shareholders--under shareholder primacy, to a noisy constituency
of shareholders, employees, and customers in the Millennial Corporation. They are worried about
reputational damage and about getting fired and they are worried that it can come from almost
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anywhere at any time. And it’s not just CEOs who are worried. It’s all senior managers, it’s almost
everyone in a position of authority inside the corporation.
Millennial prioritization of socially responsible investing, their willingness to boycott
products, work for less, and accept lower rates of return to promote their politics not just
rhetorically but in the real world, is the engine of change in corporate law today. We cannot
understand corporate behavior today without paying close attention to these generational
dynamics.
What does all this mean for the corporate law scholar? We think it means a doubling down
on legal realism. Corporate law has long turned to fields like economics to help understand and
shape itself. In particular, the past two decades have seen a sharp increase in corporate law
empiricism. But that empiricism has been almost exclusively devoted to how various corporate
governance arrangements and practices affect share price. Corporate legal scholarship has always
had a strong consequentialist bent, and we believe that this should continue. But we need to
broaden the scope of what we examine. In particular, we think that broader engagement with
political scientists and the political science literature, and broader engagement with other aspects
of business academia beyond finance and into departments like marketing and management, are
fruitful paths for further scholarship in this space. If we are correct that a major cultural shift is
taking place, in which new generations have preferences that differ sharply from those of their
forebears, then it will not be possible to understand ongoing developments in corporate law
without understanding that larger trend. Corporate law scholars should aim to study it directly,
working with scholars in other fields, furthering the trend towards interdisciplinarity.
Finally, while these recommendations may sound somewhat sweeping, the developments
we describe in the paper have consequences for corporate law scholars that are closer to home. If
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we are correct that stakeholder interests are converging, that because of Millennials and Gen Z the
interests of shareholders, employees, and consumers increasingly overlap, it follows that the
bodies of law governing shareholders, employees, and consumers will increasingly overlap too.
Inside legal academia itself, we anticipate future collaboration between corporate law, investment
law, labor and employment law, and antitrust scholars.

Conclusion
At bottom, our view of the rise of EESG is that it’s about values, Millennial values, and
increasingly Gen Z values. We do not think it’s business as usual, we do not think it’s a
managerialist plot, we do not think it’s about political gridlock or the perks of concentrated
economic power. It’s no exaggeration to say that EESG and stakeholderism are about the younger
generations’ desire to envision a habitable future for themselves. Yes, EESG might well improve
long term shareholder value, but at bottom that’s not the movement’s motivating principle. The
reality of EESG is simple: EESG is important because corporate America is facing pressure from
young people seeking to live their economic lives consistent with a set of social values. Firms and
investors are responding to the changing reality of the marketplace.
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